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bly fall into well-deserved contempt. On the other hand, if the word *unnecessary* be taken in its broad signification, the success of the movement seems to me very doubtful. There is, indeed, a large class of foreign vocables which can be styled neither necessary, because there exist German substitutes for them, nor unnecessary, because these substitutes have not yet been fully sanctioned by usage. A representative of this class is the word *Sauce*, for which *Tunke* has been proposed, a most excellent German word, certainly, and yet one that nobody will receive without a smile, for the simple reason that usage has not properly extended its sphere, but has allowed the parasite *Sauce* to stifle it and occupy its rightful place, while our mental associations clustering around *Tunke* lack the dignity and nicety of its aristocratic rival. In the same way, a large number of native words capable of a many-sided development have been stunted, especially by French intruders, and I entertain no hope of seeing the writers of the day avail themselves of these starvelings until they have been nurtured into new life and strength. The proper nurseries, I think, would be the schools, and the foundation for the German language of an Imperial Academy, a suggestion that has already been urged by Prof. Riegel.

Thus, judging from the nature of things at present as well as from the experiences of the past, the new Society, placed as it is in the dilemma of going either too far or not far enough, has taken upon itself a task of extraordinary difficulty; but for this very reason its patriotic efforts excite our admiration, and enlist our sympathies and moral support.

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IS MACAULAY'S VOCABULARY MORE LATINIZED THAN DE QUINCEY'S?

Prof. Cook's elaborate computations of the relative proportions of native and foreign elements in the vocabularies of De Quincey and Macaulay (see MODERN LANGUAGE NOTES, numbers 2 and 5) are of great interest and importance. Probably, however, most attentive readers of these authors will be surprised at

his conclusion, that De Quincey is "more Anglican than Macaulay at his best," and will find little in the facts as set forth to justify it. Professor Cook's estimates are based upon some ten thousand words from the beginning of the 'Opium Eater', and upon five thousand words from Macaulay's 'Essay on History' and an equal number from his article on 'Johnson' in the Encyclopædia Britannica. Now, any one who has given attention to the subject knows how the relative proportions of Latin and English words vary with the subject of discourse, with the audience in view, with the mood and aim of the writer, etc. Especially is this likely to be true of so vivacious, volatile, and whimsical a writer as De Quincey. Professor Cook's conclusion is, therefore, invalidated by the fact that his analysis of De Quincey's vocabulary is based upon a familiar personal narrative, while that of Macaulay's is based upon biography and criticism. Take De Quincey when he is upon good behavior, as in his 'Essay on Shakspeare' (Riverside edition, vol. vi.), and it will surely be found that the proportion of Latin words is considerably greater than in the 'Opium Eater'.

It is well known that Macaulay was always upon good behavior, even in his conversation; nevertheless, he probably does not use the same proportion of Latin words in plain narrative as in abstract exposition or argument. This consideration, again, invalidates Professor Cook's estimate of the elements of Macaulay's vocabulary at different periods of his life. The 'Essay on History' is a diffuse, critical and theoretical dissertation; the 'Life of Johnson' is a compact narrative. At any time of his life, Macaulay, or any man, would be apt to Latinize more in the former kind of composition than in the latter.

In order to make a fair comparison between the vocabularies of these or any other authors, it will be necessary to compare separately the wording in the different kinds of composition. The whole method of treatment must be carefully taken into consideration. Thus, it would hardly be fair to compare De Quincey's 'Essay on Shakspeare' with Macaulay's 'Johnson', although both were written for the Encyclopædia Britannica. For De Quincey's article is chiefly critical and argumentative, and might far more justly be compared with

the latter part of Macaulay's 'Essay on Bacon'. Perhaps 'The Flight of a Tartar Tribe' is as pure an example of a narrative of any length as can be found in De Quincey, but its style is so scenical that it would be obviously misleading to compare it with Macaulay's 'Johnson'. In fine, literary, personal, and historical narratives are distinct categories which involve different vocabularies and should, therefore, in these estimates, be considered separately.

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GRAMMAR WANTED.

I heartily agree with my friend Prof. Garner that we need an improved English grammar. It is time that this long martyrdom of our language on the rack of the Latin grammarians should cease, and that we should have a grammar founded on logic and recognition of the operations of the mind.

If the trouble lay only in nice questions or delicate distinctions, such as those connected with the moods, the need would not be so urgent; but in most grammars confusion and irrationality reign in even the elementary principles.

Take, for example, the question of case. I open the first grammar before me, a book of eight hundred mortal pages (to say nothing of four pages of recommendations in which it is lauded to the skies)—and under the head of case I find the following statements:—

"Case denotes the relation which a noun sustains to other words in the sentence Nouns have three cases."—and a little farther:—

"It has been a question how many cases should be admitted in the English language. If a change of termination is essential to constitute a case there are but two cases If, on the other hand, it should be claimed [*sic*] that the use of a preposition constitutes a case, then there are as many cases as there are prepositions. We are therefore justified, on the ground of convenience, in admitting at least three cases."

From this we learn that this grammarian is of opinion that nouns, in English at least, have but three relations to each other; that he is quite uncertain what constitutes a case; (could he not have postponed writing his grammar

until he had gained some light on this point?) but that whatever a case may be, he is justified in admitting three of them. (We also see that he would perceive no logical error in this proposition: "if the use of a crown constitutes a king, there are in every monarchy as many kings as there are crowns.")

So a man can write eight hundred pages of grammar without discovering these simple facts about nouns:

First, that grammatical case is the conventional indication in language of the kind of relation existing between the *things* spoken of; and as many kinds of relations as there are between things, be they three or three million, so many cases are there, whether grammarians choose to admit them, or not. To say that any case is wanting to any language, is to say that there is a kind of relation between things that cannot be expressed in that language.

Secondly, that the signs of cases are very different things from the cases themselves; that identical cases may have different signs, and different cases identical signs.

Thirdly, that the cases which indicate identical relations must be identical, whatever the sign may be. If we call the case of *king* possessive in the phrase "the king's crown," the case is identical in "the crown of the king," or if we put it in French and say "la couronne du roi." Whatever we may choose to call the cases of *mihi* and *gladio* in the phrases "da mihi malum," "occidit eum gladio," they are identical with those of *me* and *sword* in the corresponding phrases "give me an apple," "he slew him with a sword." Conversely, "him," in the phrases "I brought him the letter," and "I brought him home," is in different cases, although the form is the same.

So with regard to "government." My grammarian, of course, says "prepositions govern the objective case." In another place, "*the wisdom of man* has been called the analytical possessive." Again, "prepositions are sometimes understood; as, 'he gave me a book' = 'he gave to me a book.'" "These are *remains* of dative forms and may be parsed without the aid of a preposition." "In the phrase 'give it him' we have a dative case. The objective case and the preposition *to* are often *equivalent* to the dative case." Surely a grammarian ought to know whether a given